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THE  FED’S NEW MODEL OF SUPERVISION FOR “LARGE 
COMPLEX BANKING ORGANIZATIONS”: COORDINATED RISK-
BASED SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL MULTINATIONALS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STABILITY 
CYNTHIA CRAWFORD LICHTENSTEIN* 
 
 
 Ever since the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990’s,1 there has 
been considerable debate among academic scholars concerning an 
appropriate structure for overseeing the multinational purveyors of 
international financial services.2 The proposed structures differ 
significantly.  On one hand, there is the present so-called international 
financial architecture3 of intergovernmental committees with no 
discernible personality in international law.  Committees such as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (hereafter “BCBS”4, the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (hereafter “IOSCO”5), and the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (“IAIS”6) produce sets 
of “principles” or “best practice standards” on regulation and supervision 
having no legal force until enacted domestically.7  On the other hand, there 
is a proposal for an international agreement to implement harmonized 
standards8 and proposals for a global regulator.9 
                                                 
* 
DISTINGUISHED VISITING PROFESSOR OF LAW, GEORGE WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, FALL 2001-2004;  VISITING PROFESSOR, BROOKLYN LAW 
SCHOOL, FALL 2005; PROFESSOR EMERITUS, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL. SPECIAL 
THANKS FOR HER RESEARCH AID IN THE WRITING OF THIS NOTE ARE DUE TO MICHELLE 
PARTEN, J.D. EXPECTED 2006, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL. 
1 See Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein, Dealing with Sovereign Liquidity Crises: New 
International Initiatives for the New World of Volatile Capital Flows to and from 
Emerging Markets, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 807 (1998) (describing the origins of this 
crisis from the point of view of an academic interested in the interconnections between 
bank safety and soundness and international financial stability). 
2 See JOHN EATWELL & LANCE TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCIAL RISK (New 
Press 2000). 
3 See THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIA L ARCHITECTURE 
(Rosa Lastra, ed., 2001) (providing a collection of essays on this “architecture”). 
4 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at http://www.bis.org/bcbs (last visited 
June 26, 2005). 
5 International Organization of Securities Commissions, at http://www.iosco.org  (last 
visited June 26, 2005). 
6 International Association of Insurance Supervisors, at http://www.Iaisweb.org (last 
visited June 26, 2005). 
7 See Herbert V. Morais, The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance vs. 
Sovereignty, 50 KAN L. REV. 779 (2002) (describing the three “organisations” listed as 
well as a complete catalogue of other international standards and their formulations in 
2002). 
8 Mario Giovanoli, A New Architecture for the Global Financial Market: Legal Aspects 
 The general question of whether nonbinding “standards” can 
achieve an adequate level of compliance with international norms in any 
particular area of international concern (for example, the environment, the 
international financial system, oversight of nuclear proliferation) has 
spawned at least two important books: “The New Sovereignty” by Abram 
and Antonia Chayes10 and a collection of significant essays by 
international law commentators titled “Commitment and Compliance: The 
Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System.”11 This 
theoretical literature agrees on one fundamental proposition: the safety and 
soundness of the internationally active financial conglomerates12 that link 
together13 the economies of both the industrialized countries and the 
emerging market countries into one global financial system are paramount 
to international financial stability. 
This belief in the necessity of the safety and soundness of 
internationally active financial conglomerates for global financial stability 
is based upon the general understanding of what is labeled “systemic 
risk”14 (“SR”).  As will be discussed subsequently,15 the U.S. central bank, 
which is the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“the 
                                                                                                                         
of International Financial Standard Setting, in INTERNATIONAL MONETA RY LAW: 
ISSUES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM (Mario Giovanoli ed., 2000). Contra  Cynthia 
Crawford Lichtenstein, Hard Law v. Soft Law: Unnecessary Dichotomy? 35 INT’L 
LAW. 1433 (2001). 
9 See EATWELL & TAYLOR, supra  note 2, at 208 (proposing to create a “World 
Financial Authority”). 
10 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW 
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIA NCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
AGREEMENTS (1995). 
11  OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE 
ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM    
(Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). 
12 Note that the term used here is “financial conglomerates” rather than internationally 
active “banks.” As has been well written about by Joseph Norton & Christopher Olive, A 
By-Product of the Globalization Process: The Rise of Cross Border Bank Mergers and 
Acquisitions—The U.S. Regulatory Framework , 56 BUS. LAW, 591 (2001) the 
consolidation of the large enterprises, whenever headquartered, engaged in financial 
services cross border has created a new class of financial services providers that dominate 
the global financial markets. Since the repeal of Glass-Steagall, 13 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377-
78 (1994) repealed 1999 by the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act Pub. L. No. 106-102, 1338 
(1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.) the very large U.S. banks such 
as Morgan-Chase and Citibank, themselves the products of the wave of banking mergers 
in the United States, have grouped together under one “financial services holding 
company” a combination of banking, securities and insurance services to rival the largest 
of the financial conglomerates headquartered in other industrialized countries, regardless 
of whether those conglomerates are primarily banking firms, securities firms or insurance 
firms. 
13 Space prevents a description of the linkages themselves. Trouble in the Clearing House 
International Payments System (CHIPS) from the Herstatt affair is often cited as the 
original cause of the formation of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
14 It must be acknowledged that not all commentators on the international financial scene 
believe in the existence of “systemic risk,” or at least that such risk might be occasioned 
by the failure of one of the conglomerates. See, e.g ., HAL SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS POLICY AND REGULATION (11th ed. 2004). 
15   Id. 
Fed”) and presently has supervisory functions for certain types of 
depository institutions in the United States, including foreign banking 
organizations in the United States) and is also the so-called “umbrella” 
supervisor for the “financial services holding companies” authorized in 
1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 16  The Fed regularly issues so- 
called “Supervisory Letters” to its examiners, supervisory officers at the 
regional Federal Reserve banks, and the domestic and foreign banking 
organizations it supervises.  Each Letter is identified by an SR number for 
the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation of  the Fed.   
On May 28, 2003, the Fed issued a supervisory letter (“SR letter”), 17 
attaching an Interagency Paper providing guidance (“sound practices”) 
agreed upon by the Fed, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
(“SEC”), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the primary 
supervisor for the U.S. federally chartered banks or “national” banks) for 
the supervision of (1) “. . .organizations that are deemed to present a type 
of systemic risk to U.S. financial markets . . .” (subsequently described as 
“core clearing and settlement organizations”) and (2) financial institutions 
“that play significant roles in critical financial markets.” The SR described 
these two types of organizations as “pos[ing] higher degrees of systemic 
risk should they be unable to recover or resume critical activities that 
support critical markets.”18   
 
The SR Letter then defines the term “systemic risk,” associated with the 
first type of organization, as: 
 
 the risk that the failure of one participant in a transfer system or 
financial market to meet its required obligations will cause other 
participants to be unable to meet their obligations when due, 
causing significant liquidity or credit problems and threatening the 
stability of financial markets. The definition is drawn from a 
glossary of terms used in payment and settlement systems. 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Bank for 
International Settlements (2001).19 
 
Both the SR Letter and the attached Interagency Paper define “firms that 
play significant roles in critical financial markets,” the second type of 
organization  mentioned above, as those that “. . .clear or settle at least five 
                                                 
16   See supra  note 12 and accompanying text. 
17   FRB: Supervisory Letter SR 03-9 on Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to 
Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial System (May 28, 2003, at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLETTERS/2003/SR0309.htm (last visited 
June 26, 2005) 
18  Id ¶ 1. 
19 Id ¶ 4. 
percent of the value of transactions in a critical market.”20  The 
Interagency Paper then declares the “critical financial markets” to include 
the markets for federal funds, foreign exchange, commercial paper, U.S. 
government and agency securities, and corporate debt and equity 
securities. 
To translate the Interagency Paper, the Fed, the SEC and the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency are announcing publicly that a firm 
participating in, clearing or jointly setting at least five percent of the value 
of  transactions in one of the above listed markets that fails to meet its 
obligations as they become due, threatens the stability of the U.S. financ ial 
system. The Interagency Paper suggests preparing back-ups in the event of 
wide-scale disruption.  Indeed, the Paper was prepared because of the 
September 11, 2001 (“9/11”) terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, the Letter and 
its attached Interagency Paper imply that a single “large” (as defined) 
firm’s insolvency could cause great havoc in both the domestic and the 
international financial markets. 
At this point, one may ask why is this SR Letter and attached Paper 
addressing financial market disruption when that is just the function 
normally taken on by any country’s central bank or other agency assigned 
the lender-of- last-resort (“LOLR”) function in the economy. Indeed, in the 
afternoon of 9/11, the Fed, the Bank of England and the European Central 
Bank (which, not having clear LOLR authority itself, had convened by 
telephone all eleven of its national central banks) all issued press releases 
assuring the markets that each Bank stood ready to provide whatever 
liquidity the markets needed to ensure that the 9/11 tragedy did not cause 
an international financial system failure.  The central banks coordinated 
successfully because the Fed of New York, acting with Chairman 
Greenspan, heroically called its counterparts in London and Frankfurt to 
make arrangements necessary to calm the critical international markets. 
Unfortunately, however, in the case of a threat to the international 
system from the failure of one huge multinational financial conglomerate, 
determining which sovereign’s LOLR will lead the “bailout” is not so 
obvious. The Basel Concordat21 delineates supervisory authority to the 
central bank “responsible” for the insolvency of a multinational bank 
present in more than one country. However, it does not obligate any 
central bank to support the delinquent institution. Indeed, for the first 
years of its existence, the Concordat was not published for fear of 
encouraging “moral hazard.” 
Thus, we are left with the question: if certain very large multinational 
financial institutions responsible for more than five percent of the 
                                                 
20 Id ¶ 1. 
21 Basel Committee: Principles for the Supervision of Banks’ Foreign Establishments-
Basle Concordat (May 1983)  at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc312.pdf. (last visited June 
26, 2005). 
 
transactions in the federal funds (a huge interbank dollar market), foreign 
exchange, commercial paper, government bond, corporate debt, or equity 
securities markets present “systemic risk” to the international financial 
system in the event of failure, how does the “international community”22  
ensure “the safety and soundness” of these conglomerates? It is at this 
point that I lay bare my conviction that the theoretical debate as to the 
legal nature of the rules is unhelpful.  Instead, what is helpful is analyzing 
how effective the supervisors are at overseeing these conglomerates.  
Since the business of these conglomerates is complex financial 
engineering, they need highly sophisticated oversight.  Also important is 
ensuring that supervisors cooperate when overseeing the conglomerate’s 
business units, wherever located. 
At this point it is necessary to discuss the difference between 
“regulation” and “supervision.”23 This difference might seem to present a 
tangential discussion, but does not. Consider the ordinary business 
corporation in jurisdictions with capital markets. If it raises capital by 
issuing securities to the public, it is subject to regulation by the securities 
regulators who have jurisdiction over the corporation pursuant to 
legislation or a supranational24  entity that purports to be prescribing the 
regulation.  A government prescribes the penalty to be imposed upon 
corporate entities for violating applicable regulations (civil or criminal), 
and in some cases, such as mutual funds (which, after all, are only 
ordinary business corporations whose business is to hold interests in other 
corporations), the regulations will provide for periodic inspections of the 
books and records of a fund, and require fund advisors to be certain that 
their funds are adhering to prescribed regulations.  In the case of the 
ordinary business corporation in the United States, federal securities 
regulators do not usually inspect the actual books and records of the 
corporation.  Instead (and I believe this is true of most other industrialized 
countries), there exist framework accounting rules set by securities 
regulators prescribing how the corporation shall keep its books and 
records and report to its shareholders. In the United States, regulators 
permit the corporation issuing public securities to hire private auditors 
who ensure that company “financial statements” accurately reflect true 
financial condition. The hired auditors inspect and “certify” the financial 
statements according to their own set of principles, customarily called 
“generally accepted accounting principles,” or “GAAP”. 
                                                 
22 Forgive the author for using a term so long out of use. I was educated at a time when that was the term used 
to mean the cooperation of states to ensure that all those economic entities under each state’s jurisdiction were 
subject to regulation for whatever was the agreed upon “common good.” 
23 See Rosa Lastra, The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe, 10 
COLUM. J. EUR. L.49 (2003) (defining “[s]upervision” as “oversight of financial firm’ behavior, in particular, 
“Monitoring” and “[R]egulation” as rolemaking”). 
24 This term refers to law creating supranational entities that legislate for financial markets and financial market 
actions headquartered or doing business in the confederation of states they cover. The prime example is the 
European Union. See id. (describing how the EU is legislating financial services regulation.) 
There are penalties, of course, for falsifying the books, but there is an 
enormous amount of space, as we know from the Enron and WorldCom 
scandals, for wiggle room—or, one might say, varying interpretations of 
GAAP. The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation25 in the United States and other 
forms of revised corporate regulation abroad have attempted to deal with 
some of the problems arising out of this system, trying to ensure that 
investors are given accurate, or at least not misleading, information about 
the financial condition of the corporation they have invested in.26  
However, the relevance of the Enron episode and its aftermath to this 
thesis is only that the failure of Enron, although disastrous for its 
employees, pensioners, creditors and stock holders, did not have systemic 
implications. The bankruptcies of Enron and Worldcom have not 
occasioned international financial instability and in fact, might be said to 
represent only the government’s failure to protect consumers. 
Now consider the regulatory/supervisory system for depository 
institutions or “banks,” and their affiliates as best practices in the area as 
expressed in the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision27 issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(“BCBS”) in 1997.  First, banks are inspected  (“examined”) on-site by a 
regulator corps of examiners.  The examination is completed on a regular 
schedule.  Examiners review the books and records required to be on file, 
as well as mandatory reports (in accordance with accounting rules set by 
the regulator, or “RAP,” not by the acounting profession) to ensure, to the 
extent possible, that the bank is not skirting any regulation.  In addition to 
the at least annual on-site examination that all federally supervised banks 
must undergo in the United States, the Fed monitors off site (from the 
figures in the required mandatory quarterly Call Reports referred to above) 
off-site banks for which it is the regulator. To do this, the Fed uses highly 
sophisticated and rigorously tested electronic systems. “Output from the 
systems is used to accelerate the on-site examinations of institutions 
showing financial deterioration, to identify the areas of most supervisory 
concern in those institutions scheduled for examination; and to allocate the 
more experienced examiners to troubled institutions.” If the examiners, 
who in the United States are specially trained, find rules violations, or 
simply a financial situation in need of immediate remedial action, the law 
                                                 
25 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 
15, 18, 28 and 129 U.S.C.). 
26 Jeff Madrick, Economic Scene: Where Economists Stand, or Don’t Stand, on the Issue of Corporate 
Scandals, N.Y.TIMES, Oct . 28, 2004, at C2, (noting that David A. Sneed of the University of Pennsylvania 
School of Law thinks that Sabanes-Oxley did not go far enough and that, among the other reforms proposed in 
his ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND 
WHERE THEY CAME FROM  (2004), he proposes that auditors would be assigned by 
the stock exchanges themselves.) 
27 BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR 
EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION (Sept.1997) at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdf (last visited June 26, 2005). 
gives them a panoply of remedial enforcement tools.28  One may ask here, 
why does such an expensive system of ensuring compliance with law and 
regulation to say nothing of pre-failure intervention used in connection 
with banks of deposit exist when, in the usual case, the failure of an 
individual bank will not have systemic implications, either nationally, or 
internationally?29 The answer, of course, has to do with the state subsidy 
to the banks of the deposit guarantee scheme in the jurisdiction.  To the 
extent that the taxpayers are ultimately on the hook for the bank’s funding, 
the government, as the voice of the taxpayers, will insist on influencing 
business management. 
But then we move to the next level, those financial conglomerates 
(with or without a bank having guaranteed retail deposits at the center)30 
whose possible failure is considered by the industrialized countries’ 
central banks to have internationally significant systemic implications.31 
                                                 
28 See Rebel A. Cole et al., FIMS: A New Monitoring System for Banking Institutions, 81 
FED. RES. BULL. 1 (1995). 
29 We are not speaking here of depository institutions in emerging markets that fund themselves in the interbank 
markets in foreign currencies, thus incurring transfer risk and creating considerable risk for their country’s 
macro-economy. See Lichtenstein, supra note 1. 
30 At the present time, Fed supervision of financial conglomerates is limited to those that do include a 
depository bank, but as will be recalled from the text at note 17, the supervisor of stand-alone U.S. securities 
firms, the SEC, has joined in the issuance of the Interagency Paper describing “sound practices” to “strengthen 
the resilience of the U.S. financial system,” the Paper that defines “systemic risk” and, in effect, admits that 
securities firms of the size described in the Paper can also present systemic risk. See also the justification for 
prudential supervision of large securities firms (as opposed to conduct of business rule-making for consumer 
protection purposes) in Michael Taylor, “Twin Peaks.” A Regulatory Structure for the New Century (Centre for 
the Study of Financial Innovation 1995), at 4 “Banks have traditionally been seen as the key systemically 
important institutions. However, as the Promised report of 1992 observed [footnote omitted], a wide range of 
financial firms can now create potentially systemic problems (emphasis in the original), given the importance of 
non- bank financial firms—securities houses, insurance companies, trusts and others—in the OTC (“over-the-
counter”) derivatives markets, including as market makers in some cases.” See also  infra  text at note 44. 
This understanding that all forms of financial multinationals, whether or not the conglomerate has a 
“bank” at its center, may be systemically important has now permeated the work of the international financial 
institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, to spread implementation of the Basel Core Principles,  supra  n., to 
their client states. CESARE CALARI & STEFAN INGRES, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND 
WORLD BANK, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASEL CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING 
SUPERVISION, EXPERIENCES, INFLUENCES, AND PERSPECTIVES, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/bcore/2002/092302.pdf at p. 25, ¶ 49: 
Developments in financial markets: Three main developments in the financial markets since 1997 need to 
be taken into consideration in review of the BCPs and the Methodology: continued internationalisation of 
financial markets, the blurring of boundaries between the traditional financial sub-sectors banking, 
insurance and securities, and acceleration of financial sector consolidation. All these changes demonstrate 
an increasing need for cooperatio n and coordination in regulations and practices between domestic and 
international financial supervisory agencies to establish a consistent group-wide framework. This would 
comprise supervisors from different sectors and countries, which can effectively supervise a multinational 
financial conglomerate. 
31 One should note here that at least as of the year 2000, the Fed did not seem to be openly justifying the 
“umbrella supervision” of financial conglomerates applying for financial holding company (“FHC”)status under 
the Bank Holding Company Act 12 U.S.C. § 1842 et seq. as amended by the Gramn-Leach Bliley Act, supra 
note 12 , to enable the conglomerates to affiliate with securities and insurance firms given to the Fed by the 
GLB Act on the grounds of international systemic stability. Instead, the Fed in its Supervisory Letter issued on 
August 15, 2000 on its “Framework for Financial Holding Company Supervision,” SR.00-13 (SUP), available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs.srletters/2000/SR0013.htm, August 15, 2000, stated: “The Federal 
Reserve, as umbrella supervisor, will seek to determine that FHCs are operated in a safe and sound manner so 
that their financial condition does not threaten the viability of its depository institution subsidiaries.”  The Fed 
This is the group of entities (at least those with a bank at the center at 
the time) that the BCBS originally focused on, “large internationally 
active banking organizations,” when promulgating (if such a term may be 
used for a group with no identifiable legal persona lity) the Basel 
Concordat32 in 1983 and the Basel Accord (“Basel I” and amendments) of 
1988.33 This is the group of entities as enlarged by the addition of the 
groups of systemically important securities houses and equivalent 
insurance affiliates for whom the Fed’s methods of supervision and 
examination have changed significantly with the issuance by the Fed in 
1997 of its “Handbook” titled: “Framework for Risk-Focused Supervision 
of Large Complex Institutions,” as the attachment to SR 97-24 (SUP) 
(Oct. 27, 1997).34  
The remainder of this paper will concentrate on a detailed, if not 
overly technical, description of the Fed’s new approach to supervising 
large complex banking organizations (“LCBOs”), whether the entities are 
headquartered in the United States, with the Fed as the home country 
supervisor or abroad with the Fed as the supervisor of the U.S. office (host 
supervisor).35  The rationale for the Fed’s development of the new 
program of supervision should be clear from the perhaps lengthy 
description previously given and that follows of LCBOs changed role in 
systemic risk. For an excellent description of both how entities come to be 
classified as warranting the new approach to supervision and a history of 
the program’s development, one should refer to the paper published in 
2001 in the Federal Reserve Bulletin by Lisa M. DeFerrari and David E. 
Palmer, both of the Fed’s Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation 
(DeFerrari and Palmer).36 
The curious thing about this program and its corollary, the special 
program for supervision of FBOs described in footnote 55, is how little 
attention the government has  paid to the revised—and very different—
program of supervision in the legal literature. De Ferrari and Palmer are 
                                                                                                                         
does not spell out the possible consequences of such a lack of “viability,” but this paper will be spelling out how 
the risk -based supervision process for “LCBOs” (read “FHCs”) certainly tracks the Basel concept of risk -based 
capital adequacy standards as rearticulated in Basel II, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A revised Framework and that Fed has announced 
will only be applied to a “small number of large, internationally active U.S. banking organizations,” Joint Press 
Release, June 26, 2004. The Supervisory Letter is required reading for anyone interested in the issue of the Fed 
as “umbrella supervisor.” 
32  Supra note 21. 
33 BASEL COMMITTEE: INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND 
CAPITAL STANDARDS (Apr. 1998) at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf (last visited June 26, 2005). 
34 Federal Reserve Supervisory Letter SR 97-24 (SUP) (Oct. 27, 1997), available at http://www.federal 
reserve.Gov/boarddocs/SRLETTERS/1997/SR9724.htm. 
35 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), Pub.L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, 
placed supervision of all foreign bank entry, whether directly by offices of the foreign bank licensed by a state 
banking authority or the Comptroller of the Currency or by the creation of a banking subsidiary chartered by 
either a state or under federal law, in Fed. As is noted in DeFerrari & Palmer, infra  note 37, at 55, “. . . large 
FBOs account for approximately one third of the banking organizations in [Fed’s] LCBO program.” 
36 See Lisa M. DeFerrari & David E. Palmer, Supervision of Large Complex Banking Organizations, 87 FED. 
RES. BULL  47 (2001). 
not law professors, nor does the Federal Reserve Bulletin qualify as a law 
review, regardless of how useful it is to financial services practitioners 
seeking background.  The author has found only one law review piece that 
refers to the relevant Supervisory Letters and attempts to describe the new 
system: Joseph J. Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modern International 
Financial Regulation: Increasing Reliance on a Public-Private 
Partnership (“Norton”).37 Unfortunately, Norton seems to  misconceive 
the purpose and the mechanics of the new supervisory approach, because 
he theorizes a form of regulatory capture of the supervisory authorities by 
what he calls “elite banks,” and posits that “. . . the larger and more 
influential elite banks have considerably greater financial and intellectual 
resources at their disposal than the government agencies, in terms of 
expertise in dealing with increasingly complex and global risk 
exposures,”38 and he describes the new form of supervision and its 
oversight of internally generated econometric risk measurement models as 
“privatisation.” According to its author, the article “. . . explores the notion 
of a ‘risk-focused’ supervisory regime coupled with a ‘self-regulatory’ 
regime (i.e., ‘qualified self- regulation’) [presumably the internal models] 
as a modern manifestation of and a trend towards ‘a quasi or partial 
privatization’ of what traditionally would have been the exclusive domain 
of government.”39  
Moreover, Norton has not given sufficient credence to the mechanics 
and staffing of the new form of supervision for LCBOs. In his article, he 
asks some very good conceptual questions concerning banking authorities’ 
decisions to intervene (through monetary, supervisory, or regulatory 
policy) in “periods of systemic risk, distress, crisis and failure.”40  The 
paragraph with these questions (replicated below in footnote 40) ends with 
the statement: “These questions should be cautiously explored in 
developing future reforms to large bank supervision and capital adequacy 
                                                 
37 See Joseph J. Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modern International Financial Regulation: Increasing Reliance 
on a Public-Private Partnership, 37 INT’L LAW . 43 (2003). 
 
38 Id. at 51. 
39 Id at 44. 
40 Id. at 52. These questions are: First, how and on the basis of what information 
should elite bank risk management and internal control systems be continuously 
supervised and evaluated by banking authorities over time? Second, how can the 
credit, market, and operational risks undertaken by an elite bank be measured and its 
capital adequacy evaluated in real time? Third, how can elite bank senior 
management be held accountable for meaningful deficiencies in risk management 
and internal control systems and for capital inadequacy? Fourth, how should such 
accountability be defined and determined (in terms of regulatory enforcement or 
public disclosure or both), and what is the objective of holding persons or institutions 
accountable? Fifth, what should be the standard for holding such senior management 
accountable for risk management and internal controls failures that result in 
substantial losses to the banks and/or jeopardize the national or global banking and 
financial systems?  
frameworks.”41 
This author could not agree more with these conceptual questions, but, 
contrary to Norton, believes that the Fed’s new system supervsing LCBOs 
as set out in SR99-15 (Sup)42 (to be discussed below and as described in 
De Ferrari & Palmer43) has been designed specifically to respond to these 
questions.  It is the thesis of this paper that the new framework, rather than 
being a “privatisation” of supervision or a “partnership” of the “elite” 
banks and their U.S. central bank supervisor (the Fed), as argued by 
Norton, is the attempt by the supervisor to ensure, by its processes and 
staffing of supervision of LCBOs, that it is setting the supervision agenda 
for itself, other U.S. supervisors and foreign supervisors, and that it is 
attempting to ensure the ultimate responsibility of a central bank.44 
In conjunction with reading Ms. Petrou’s testimony, 45 one should 
consider the Fed’s Press Release in re Supervisory Letter Concerning 
Capital Adequacy (July 1, 1999) and its attached Supervisory Letter 
whose subject is entitled “Assessing Capital Adequacy in relation to Risk 
at Large Banking Organizations and Others with Complex Risk Profiles,” 
reprinted in “SWAPS and other derivatives in 1999,” PLI Corporate Law 
and Practice Course Handbook Series, November 1999.46  The Press 
Release states that the attached Letter grew out of a “recent supervisory 
review of internal capital management processes” at several LCBOs. The 
Press Release also reiterates that “[s]upervisory letters are the primary 
means by which the Federal Reserve communicates key policy directives 
to its examiners, supervisory staff, and the banking industry,” and states as 
“the long-term goal[s]” of the attached Supervisory Letter to encourage 
broader adoption of sound practices in internal analysis of capital 
adequacy, to promote further innovation and enhancements by the industry 
                                                 
41 Id. at 53 
42 Supra  note 37. 
43 Id. 
44 See also  Karen Shaw Petrou, Address before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the 
United States Senate (June 18, 2003), in BASEL II: BABY IN THE BATH WATER WORTH SAVING, 
available at http://www.fedfin.com/press_center/Petrous_senate_testimony_061803.pdf.  Granted that Ms. 
Petrou is in effect a lobbyist for the “elite” Norton writes about, this author nevertheless finds her writings 
analytical and persuasive. In her Senate testimony, Petrou is arguing against the inclusion of a capital charge for 
so-called “operational risk “in Pillar I of the proposed revised Capital Accord upon which the BCBS has been 
laboring since 1999. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENTS AND CAPITAL STANDARDS. A REVISED FRAMEWORK (June 2004), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm (last visited June 26, 2005) (Basel II). As Petrou summarizes in her 
testimony, the three pillars of Basel II are “improved regulatory capital standards, better supervision and more 
disclosure.” Op. cit supra , at p. 4. She goes on to say: “If Pillars 2 and 3 work well, then Pillar 1—the capital 
standards—need not be as formulaic and far-reaching as currently proposed because supervisors will have 
ample tools to tailor regulatory capital to individual circumstances and markets will know when this isn’t being 
done.” Id. The United States has excellent supervisory standards and ample authority “to discipline banks for 
problems that have nothing to do with capital standards.” She concludes (on p. 5): “U.S. regulators, I think, 
could have done much for the global financial system and avoided many of the pitfalls in Basel II if more 
attention had been paid to exporting our strict supervisory standards and their effective enforcement.” 
45 See supra  note 44. 
46 1147 PLI/Corp 281. 
in this area, and to integrate better such internal analysis into the 
supervisory process.47 
The Letter itself directs supervisors and examiners (the difference is in 
rank, with the “supervisors” being the officers of the regional Federal 
Reserve Banks and of the Fed in D.C. who are in charge of the supervision 
process, and the “examiners” being the government employees who are 
actually carrying out the examination process on the ground or through the 
electronic process “. . .to evaluate internal [emphasis added] capital 
management processes to judge whether they meaningfully tie the 
identification, monitoring, and evaluation of risk to the determination of 
the institution’s capital needs.”48  To support such an evaluation, the Letter 
continues by detailing what it calls “the fundamental elements of a sound 
internal capital adequacy analysis” as well as “the key areas of risk to be 
accompanied by such analysis.” In particular, examiners, “[u]sing as a 
guide the elements of sound practice described in this SR Letter,” are 
directed to “evaluate whether the organization is making adequate 
progress in assessing its capital needs on the basis of the risks arising from 
its business activities, rather than focusing its internal processes primarily 
on compliance with regulatory standards . . . .”49 The Supervisory Letter 
contains highly sophisticated direction as to how a “sound internal capital 
adequacy analysis” is accomplished,50 and directs examiners to review a 
bank’s “analysis, including the target levels of capital chosen, to determine 
whether it is sufficiently comprehensive and relevant to the current 
operating environment.51   
One may contrast the Fed’s instructions in this Supervisory Letter 
issued in 1999 with Norton’s conclusion in his 2003 piece that “[T]he 
‘risk-focused supervision’ concept essentially redirects responsibility and 
accountability for the design, development and implementation of risk 
management and internal control systems to the elite banks themselves, 
subject to general and objective (and, at times, subjective) standards for 
such systems established by the banking authorities, and to supervisory 
oversight of such systems.”52 
 
The initial Supervisory Letter (SR 97-24 (sup)), attaching the new 
“Handbook” titled “Framework for Risk Focused Supervision of Large 
Complex Institutions,” explains that “[O]ver the last several years, a major 
strategic initiative of the Federal Reserve has been to develop and 
implement an examination and supervision program for large domestic 
and foreign banking organizations that focuses more effectively on an 
                                                 
47 Id. at 285. 
48 Id. at 288. 
49 Id. 
50 Id.at 291.    
51 Id. at 296. 
52 Norton,  supra note 37, at 53. 
organization’s principal risks and on its internal systems and processes for 
managing and controlling these risks.”53  The Fed further explains that the 
“. . . best practice in the supervision and regulation of banking 
organizations is an evolving concept that must continually respond to 
important developments in banking, . . . the changing nature of risk-
taking . . . and the globalization and integration of financial institutions 
and markets.”54 It is notable that this change in the Fed’s conception of 
supervision and examination applies to both large domestic and foreign 
banking organizations.55  The distinction that the Fed now makes in its 
supervision since issuing the 1997 Handbook is not between domestic and 
foreign owned depository institutions, but between “community banks” 
and LCBOs. As the Foreword to the “Handbook” states: “The complexity 
of financial products, sophistication of risk management systems 
(including audit and internal controls), management structure, and 
geographic dispersion of operations are but a few of the areas in which 
large institutions may be distinguished from community banks.”56 
 
Interestingly, at the same time that the Fed was developing both its 
program for supervision of foreign banking organizations in the United 
States57 and its new initiative for risk-focused supervision, 58 September 
                                                 
53Federal Reserve Supervisory Letter SR 97-24 (sup) (Oct. 27, 1997), available at 
http//www.Federal reserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLetters/1997/SR9724.htm.  
54 Id. 
55 Supervision and examination of foreign banking organizations (FBO’s), of course, necessitated certain 
refinements of the new initiative. SR 00-14 (SUP), Oct. 23, 2000 describes the enhancement of “the Interagency 
Program for Supervising the U.S. Operations of Foreign Banking Organizations” originally established in 
March 1995. That program differs from the Risk Focused Framework in that it provides for a process entitled 
the “Strength of Support Assessment” (SOSA), meaning an evaluation of the organization’s (that is, the foreign 
banking organization—the top parent abroad, the foreign equivalent of a domestic FHC) “ability to provide 
financial, liquidity and management support to its U.S. operations.” Federal Reserve Board Division of Bankin g 
Supervision & Regulation, Enhancements to the Interagency Program for Supervising the U.S. Operations of 
Foreign Banking Organizations, ii. (Aug. 8, 1999), available at http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2000/SR0014.htm. The foreword to the “Handbook,” see supra note 53, in its 
third paragraph notes specifically that the new initiative in examination incorporates the U.S. operations of 
FBO’s, and warns that since the “Federal Reserve is a host country supervisor rather than the home country 
consolidated supervisor . . . the risk-focused examination process needs to be carried out within the framework 
of the FBO program which fully accounts for these differences and was agreed to with other supervisors in 
1995.” The enhancement to the supervision of FBOs in 2000 carried out the approach of the Risk-Focused 
Supervision initiative to interaction with senior management of the large institutions the initiative focused on, 
that is, “. . . the Federal Reserve and other U.S. bank supervisory agencies have agreed to begin informing both 
the FBO’s senior management and its home country supervisor of the foreign bank’s SOSA ranking.” The 
author understands from a former supervisor that not only is the home country supervisor informed of the 
FBO’s SOSA ranking, but that the U.S. supervisors and the foreign supervisors then talk about any 
discrepancies between the U.S. assessment of the strength of the FBO’s finances, liquidity and management and 
what the foreign supervisor is seeing in its supervision and examination. That, however, is another paper for 
another day. 
56   See supra note 53, at p.i of the attached Handbook. 
57   See supra  note 55. 
58  See supra note 34 and accompanying text . See also  Yokoi-Arai, The Evolving Concept 
of Operational Risk and Its Regulatory Treatment, 9 WTR L & BUS. REV. AM. 105, 
118 (2003) (succinctly summing up the change in approach, stating, “The supervisory 
trend of industrialized countries is evolving from balance sheet assessments to risk-based 
analysis.”). 
1997, William J. McDonough, at that time President of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, delivered a speech before the Institute of 
International Bankers.  He argued for the Fed as the umbrella supervisor 
of whatever “financial modernization” Congress might enact (which 
eventually, in 1999, Congress did with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act59) on 
the grounds that, as reported by Banking Policy Report, 
“. . . financial . . . conglomerates large enough to threaten the stability of 
the financial system should, at a minimum, be subject to some form of 
consolidated supervisory oversight that has market stability as its guiding 
principle.”60 The Report goes on to say that “McDonough said bank 
regulators should instead focus on promoting financial market stability 
and minimizing systemic risk . . . [rather than protecting the deposit 
insurance fund]. ‘Supervisors need to come up with a contemporary model 
for overseeing the activities of financial conglomerates,’ he said. It has 
become increasingly difficult for supervisors and the industry to 
distinguish between the business of banks and securities firms. . . . Given 
these linkages, the failure of either a major bank or securities firm could 
have systemic effects on the financial system.” 61 Thus, both the 
understanding the need for supervision and what the nature of that 
supervision should be was changing in the late 1990’s, not only for the 
Fed’s most senior officials, but also for perspicacious academics. 
In 1995, the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, a self-
described London “non-profit think-tank,” published a paper by Michael 
Taylor, formerly with the Bank of England and at that time director of a 
course in financial services regulation at London Guildhall University, 
entitled “‘Twin Peaks’: A Regulatory Structure for the New Century.”62 
At the time when Mr. Taylor was preparing his paper, the United 
Kingdom was debating Britain’s financial supervisory structure; a debate 
that would culminate, under the leadership of Prime Minister Blair, in a 
thorough revision of the then Financial Services Act.  The new Act 
abolished many of the self-regulatory bodies set up by its predecessor Act 
and shifted bank supervision from Bank of England to a newly formed 
“Financial Services Authority” (which not coincidentally also took over 
the functions of the Securities and Investment Board, the former U.K. 
securities regulator). 
Michael Taylor added to the deliberation by stressing in this paper two 
separate aims for supervising financial intermediaries: “to ensure the 
soundness of the financial system” and “to protect consumers from 
                                                 
59   Supra   note 16.  
60 Aspen Law & Business, Fed Reasserts Position on Designating an Umbrella 
Supervisor, 16 No. 19 BANKING POL’Y REP. 8 (1997). 
61 Id. In June, 2003, McDonough became the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of 
the U.S. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board established by the Sarbanes -
Oxley Act of 2002, supra  note 25. 
62 Supra   note 30. 
unscrupulous operators.”63 These two goals constituted the “twin peaks” 
(quite discrete peaks) of the title of his paper. His thesis suggests that UK 
financial supervision/regulation be divided into two separate agencies, 
one, the Financial Stability Commission to “ensure . . . the soundness of 
the system, the capital adequacy of banks and control of risk” and the 
other, the Consumer Protection Commission to “enforce conduct of 
business regulation to ensure that the consumer receive[s] a fair and 
honest service.”64  
For the purposes of this paper, the most interesting part of “Twin 
Peaks” is Mr. Taylor’s first of four main components of his “. . . case for 
assigning responsibility for the financial soundness of all major financial 
institutions to a single agency (emphasis in original).”65 He lists as those 
components the ideas that “a wide range of financial firms must now be 
regarded as systemically important; existing regulatory requirements raise 
issues of competitive equality . . . ; the rise of financial conglomerates 
makes a group- wide perspective . . . essential; and finally, there is a need 
to pool the rare expertise which is necessary adequately to supervise 
increasingly sophisticated trading operations.”66 
It is this fourth component that is clearly perspicacious.  Mr. Taylor 
fleshes out this notion of pooling expertise by writing later in the paper: 
 
 A final consideration also derives from the increased emphasis on 
assessing the adequacy of the internal risk control systems (including 
value-at-risk models) and the need to understand the global risk 
profile of complex financial groups. [Footnote omitted]. This is 
already creating a demand for high levels of expertise on the part of 
supervisors and regulators - a demand which is likely to expand still 
further in the coming years. Given the inability of the regulatory 
bodies to compete with the remuneration offered by the commercial 
sector, this expertise is always likely to be in short supply. Thus, there 
is a strong case for pooling the presently thinly-spread regulatory 
expertise to undertake the difficult task of adequately supervising 
sophisticated risk management systems and to develop the techniques 
necessary to come to grips with the issues posed by financial 
conglomerates.67 
 
In a subsequent section entitled, “Governance and staffing of the 
Commissions,” Mr. Taylor further explicates his notion of the need for 
rare expertise amongst supervisors of the systemically important 
                                                 
63 Id. at p i, The Executive Summary. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 4. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 11-12. 
 
international financial conglomerates: 
 
Each Commission should be responsible for recruiting its own staff, 
since the knowledge and expertise they will require will be markedly 
different. The staff of the Financial Stability Commission will need to 
have (or to acquire) the skills used by auditors and risk management 
specialists, and should include at least some with the mathematical 
background to be able to understand and assess the most advance risk 
management models. By contrast, the Consumer Protection Commission 
will require staff with a predominately legal or accounting background, 
including at least a few who are skilled in forensic accountancy. This 
contrast in skills is already apparent within the regulated firms 
themselves, where risk management specialists and compliance 
professionals are involved in different aspects of regulation (prudential 
and conduct of business respectively).68 
 
This same notion of the need for expert staffing of the supervisory teams 
examining LCBOs, what Mr. Taylor calls “complex financial groups,” 
permeates69 the Fed’s new supervisory system.  
Turning to the specifics of the new supervision process as explicated 
both in DeFerrari & Palmer,70 and in the Fed’s 1999 SR letter,  
“…build[ing] upon the Federal Reserve’s existing risk-focused 
supervision program by providing more specific guidance on the 
applicability of this program to LCBOs.”71 DeFerrari & Palmer provide a 
chart72 comparing traditional bank examinations with risk-focused 
supervision for LCBOs, one of the differences in the latter system being 
that “[I]nstitutions are assigned designated supervisory teams.  The teams 
are supplemented with specialists, who may be drawn from across the 
Federal Reserve System.”73 The article in the text explains that the 
assigned designated supervisory team is “a full-time team of Federal 
Reserve supervisors”74 for each LCBO.  The team is responsible for 
developing and maintaining the Fed’s “supervisory plan” (the nature of 
which is explained in the article) for the particular LCBO, and generally 
comprises four to ten seasoned examiners and analysts.  The team for each 
LCBO is “headed by a very senior examiner or Reserve Bank official” 
called the “central point of contact” or CPC for the particular LCBO. The 
                                                 
68 Id. at 12. 
69 Cf.supra  note 38, at 49 (stating  “banking authorities also generally lack the expertise or resources available 
to elite banks and, therefore, have the incentive to seek out the counsel and advice of constituent elite banks on 
issues pertaining to monetary, supervisory, and regulatory policies prior to or during their implementation.”) 
70 Supra  note 36. 
71 Fed. Reserve Supervisory Letter SR 99-15 (SUP) (June 23, 1999), available at http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/boarddocs/SR letters/1999/SR 9915.htm. 
72 DeFerrari & Palmer, supra  note 36, at 51. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 53. 
CPC “coordinates the development and execution of the supervisory 
strategy for the institution.”75  In addition “teams with technical expertise 
on such issues as credit-risk, modeling, payment systems, and information 
technology are available to supplement individual LCBO teams.”76 
The LCBO’s Fed team does not work alone. DeFerrari & Palmer stress 
that since the lead bank of an LCBO may have a primary supervisor (for 
example, the Comptroller of the Currency if the lead bank is a national 
bank or a foreign supervisor if the lead bank in the LCBO is a FBO) other 
than the Fed, coordination of the team with the LCBO’s primary 
supervisor is very important. The two authors point out that: 
 
“[I]n addition, systemic risk is associated with the potential disruption of 
the operations of large banks. Thus, the Federal Reserve needs to know 
more about the activities within large insured depository institutions than 
can be derived from public information or from the reports of the 
primary bank supervisor, and it also needs to have more than ad hoc 
contact with the primary bank supervisor. Similarly, the primary bank 
supervisor needs information about the activities of a bank’s parent 
company and its nonbank affiliates to be aware of, and address as 
necessary, threats to the soundness of the bank that may arise from 
elsewhere in the consolidated organization.”77 
 
Thus, in effect, the Fed seems to consider itself the lead LCBO supervisor, 
regardless of the legal structure of the organization. DeFerrari & Palmer 
continue their piece by describing the Fed’s own structural changes to 
ensure that it has the capacity to support adequately its LCBO teams. They 
describe Coordinated Supervisory Exercises as essentially a kind of 
internal simulation of an examination or sharing of knowledge from 
examination work at a number of LCBOs intended to deepen 
understanding of inherent risk in specific business activities, develop 
examiner expertise, and identify gaps and weaknesses in existing Federal 
Reserve System policies and procedures.78 
 In addition DeFerrari & Palmer describe the establishment of competing 
                                                 
75 Id. The author was informed by a former examiner that not a business day goes by without some member of 
its team being present at Citibank. Given this level of supervision and examination, one may ask why the asset 
management business in Japan managed to so violate Japanese law that it was expelled from Japan. See, 
Timothy O’Brien & Landon Thomas Jr., It’s Cleanup Time at Citi, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, § 1, at 1. 
Perhaps the answer is simply that “private banking,” managing the money of very rich individuals, does not 
entail “systemic risk,” however much violation of Japan’s consumer protection regulation may put Citibank’s 
reputation at risk, and so was not within Citi’s team’s remit. 
76 Id. at 50. 
77 Id. at 54. In this connection, consider what the Fed has to say in SR 00-13 (SUP) I supra note 31, about what 
supervisory staff may do with respect to obtaining a “specialized report” from a “functionally regulated 
subsidiary” Essentially, a regulator is speaking for the SEC in the case of an investment bank subsidiary of the 
conglomerate. Id at 6. The regulator outlines the circumstances under which the Fed “may examine,” that is, 
send in its own staff in, such a subsidiary. Id.  
78 DeFerrari & Palmer, supra  note 36, at 56. 
centers, housed at designated Reserve Banks, and intended to “…develop 
and maintain Federal Reserve System expertise in specific technical areas 
in an efficient manner.”79  The resemblance between these descriptions of 
the Fed’s supervisory process for LCBOs and Michael Taylor’s proposed 
Financial Stability Commission is obvious. 
As for the Fed’s own SR Letter on the subject, SR 99-15 (SUP),80 much of 
its content has been already covered by the description of DeFerrari & 
Palmer.81 What the Letter adds is its specific statement82 that the new 
emphasis on assessing internal policies and processes for identifying, 
measuring, monitoring, and controlling risks is in addition to “sufficient 
transaction testing to determine a financial institution’s compliance with 
sound banking practices….”83  This paper began with the observation that 
the “ordinary business corporation is not in the ordinary course examined 
at all and that the truthfulness of the data it releases to its regulators and 
the public depend upon the after-the-fact criminal penalties for fraud and 
lying.” One hopes that this paper has demonstrated that, at least for those 
financial conglomerates that are classified by the Fed as LCBOs because 
of the importance of their safety and soundness to international financial 
stability, exactly the opposite is true.  The Fed has tried to develop a 
supervisory framework with its LCBO supervision program that is 
sufficiently flexible and grounded in the supervisory system’s expertise so 
as to keep the supervisor genuinely in touch with the on-going risks of the 
business of each LCBO so supervised and in control of the efficacy of the 
institution’s own internal models of risk management. So far, it has 
worked. One can only hope that the system will continue to do so as these 
LCBOs, representing the circulatory system of the global financial 
markets, meet greater and greater financial stability challenges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 Id. 
80 Supra  note 71. 
81 See generally DeFerrari & Palmer, supra note 36. 
82 Contrary to the allegation in Norton, supra  note 37, that the Basel Committee and other 
supervisors of systemically important conglomerates have redirected “examination 
techniques to emphasize risk management and internal control systems, as opposed to 
determining through transaction testing and other static means whether a bank or LCBO 
is operating in a safe and sound manner at a given time.” Id. at 44. 
83 SR 99-15 (Sup.), supra  note 71, at 2. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
